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Abstract
This study considers how present-biased preferences influence public debt policy
when a violation of debt rules is possible. To address this issue, the study extends
the framework of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (American Economic Review 105, (2015),
1711–1737) by allowing for rule breaking with extra costs; we show that rule breaking
occurs when a country exhibits a strong present bias. We further extend the model
by introducing a political process for determining the debt rule, and we show that
a polarization of debt rules emerges between countries with high and low degrees of
present bias.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, many developed countries have experienced large budget deficits and
rapidly growing public debt. In 2007, the average general government gross debt in
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries,
as a percentage of GDP, was 53.34%, and it increased to 85.58% in 2015. In particular,
the ratio increased by more than 60 points in Greece, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom.1 This raises concerns about the sustainability of public finances and
highlights the need for fiscal rules in achieving fiscal consolidation (IMF, 2009).
Fiscal rules are expected to constrain the behavior of governments, but the enforce-
ability of these rules is questionable, as indicated by Alesina and Passalacqua (2016). As
reported in Wyplosz (2013), the United Kingdom adopted two fiscal rules in 1997: (1) the
budget deficit may only finance public investment and (2) the debt-to-GDP ratio may not
exceed 40 percent. However, while the rule was met for a few years, slippage set in after
2002. Wyplosz (2013) also reports that in the euro area, the Maastricht treaty specifies
that budget deficits cannot exceed 3 percent, but this rule was satisfied only 60 percent
of the time in the first thirteen years of the existence of euro. The evidence suggests that,
in practice, the conditions required for fiscal institutions are rarely met.
To investigate why fiscal rule violations occur so frequently, the present study focuses
on time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences. When agents are endowed with such
preferences, they change their ex-ante consumption plans, choosing to consume more in
the present and less in the future (Laibson, 1997). In particular, they are incentivized to
support, via voting, a large public debt issue; this enables them to obtain a great deal of
resources for consumption today through transfers financed by the debt issuance. Bisin,
Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015) is the first study to present a model of public debt that includes
such an incentive mechanism.
In the framework of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015), the government, representing the
present-biased agents, is assumed to stick to a given debt rule; rule breaking is abstracted
away from their analysis. However, if rule breaking is available through the payment
of extra costs, the agents may find it optimal to support the issue of public debt that
surpasses the debt ceiling. Such rule breaking depends on the degree of present bias, but
this degree differs among countries, as reported in Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2016). Thus,
the following questions arise naturally: (a) how do present-biased preferences influence
the choice of public debt issuance when rule breaking is possible and (b) what kind of a
debt rule must be put in place in response to the degree of present bias. The purpose of
this study is to address these questions.
1Source: OECD.stat. https://stats.oecd.org/ (Accessed on June 12, 2019).
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For analysis, we use the simple three-period model developed by Bisin, Lizzeri, and
Yariv (2015). Agents are endowed with goods in period 1, and they make savings and
portfolio decisions. They then receive utility from consumption in periods 2 and 3. The
period-2 selves are endowed with present-biased preferences, so they are tempted to in-
crease consumption in period 2 at the cost of reduced consumption in period 3. The
period-1 selves use illiquid assets to constrain the consumption plans of their future selves.
However, the government, representing the period-2 selves, is induced to issue public debt
to respond to the desire of the period-2 selves to undo the commitment from period 1.
This gives sophisticated agents an incentive to rebalance their portfolios in period 1 to
reestablish their commitment consumption sequence. This, in turn, creates demand for
further debt accumulation.
Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015) control the behavior of present-biased agents by im-
posing a debt ceiling. Our model differs from theirs in that debt issue beyond the ceiling
is available by incurring some additional costs. Within this extended framework, we show
that the benefits of rule breaking outweigh the costs, and, thus, rule breaking occurs if
the present bias is extremely strong and the debt ceiling is fairly low. The result could
be viewed as providing one possible key to understanding the phenomenon of fiscal rule
breaking often observed in developed countries.
The assumption of a fixed debt ceiling follows that used in Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv
(2015). This assumption is reasonable in the short run, but in the long run there is, in
reality, a tendency toward the revision of fiscal rules. For instance, according to the US
Department of the Treasury, the US debt ceiling has been raised 78 times since 1960.2
Another example involves Japan, which has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among all
developed countries. Despite the urgent need for fiscal consolidation, Japan pushed back
the target year for achieving a primary balance surplus from 2020 to 2025 given its slow
recovery from the recession.3 The evidence suggests that fiscal rules are not necessarily
rigorous requirements; rather, they can be easily revised in accordance with economic and
political conditions.
Motivated by this evidence, we extend the analysis by introducing the endogenous
determination of the debt ceiling via voting. In particular, we consider a situation where
the period-1 selves set the debt ceiling, taking into account the response of the period-2
selves. Under this setting, we investigate how the present-biased preferences affect the
design of the debt ceiling, and we show the following result. When the present bias is
weak, the period-2 selves have little incentive to change their consumption plans and thus
2Source: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-
service/debt-limit (accessed on September 27, 2019)
3Source: https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai-shimon/kaigi/cabinet/2018/2018 basicpolicies en.pdf (ac-
cessed on September 27, 2019)
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to issue public debt. They follow this debt rule even if the ceiling is set at the lowest
level, that is, even if a debt issue is prohibited. Therefore, the debt ceiling is set at zero,
which is optimal from the viewpoint of the period-1 selves’ utility maximization.
When the present bias is strong, the marginal benefits of rule breaking outweigh the
costs for the period-2 selves. Thus, the period-1 selves find it impossible to make the
period-2 selves follow the rule of no debt issue. To avoid the costs of rule breaking, the
period-1 selves set the ceiling at a maximum level such that the period-2 selves never
break it. The result, thus far, suggests that there is a threshold level for the present bias
such that the optimal ceiling for the period-1 selves varies in a substantial manner around
the threshold. This result could be viewed as providing one possible explanation for the
cross-county difference in debt rules and the resulting diverse levels of public debt among
developed countries.
As mentioned above, the present study is closely related to Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv
(2015), who demonstrate the role of present-biased preferences in fiscal policy making. The
study is also related to Halac and Yared (2018), who analyze the formation of fiscal rules
in the presence of present-biased preferences in a multi-country economy. In particular,
they compare coordinated rules, chosen jointly by a group of countries, to uncoordinated
rules, chosen independently by each country. They show that the coordinated rules are
slacker when the present bias is large. However, rule breaking is abstracted away from
their analysis. The present study, in contrast, allows rule breaking, and it derives the
optimal rules under the possibility of rule breaking by present-biased voters.
The present study also contributes to the literature on the political economy of public
debt, such as Cukierman and Meltzer (1989); Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012);
Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate (2016); Barseghyan and Battaglini (2016); and Arai,
Naito, and Ono (2018). In all of these studies, it is assumed that agents are not present
biased, and fiscal rules are taken as given. The present work advances the literature by
relaxing these assumptions, and it shows how public debt accumulation and the determi-
nation of fiscal rules are affected by the present-biased preferences of voters.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section lays out the model. The third
section demonstrates the agents’ saving decisions and the government’s fiscal policy
decisions. The fourth section characterizes the equilibrium allocation. The fifth section
extends the model to the endogenous determination of debt rules, and the last section
concludes. Proofs for the propositions are in the appendix.
2 The Model
The model is based on the one developed by Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015). It measures
identical agents who live for three periods: 1, 2, and 3. They are endowed with k units of
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goods in period 1 and nothing in periods 2 and 3. In period 1, agents only make savings
and portfolio decisions; they receive utility from consumption in periods 2 and 3.
Agents (hereafter interchangeably called individuals, selves, and voters) have time-
inconsistent, present-biased preferences (Laibson, 1997). In particular, the agents’ pref-
erences regarding consumption in periods 2 and 3, c2 and c3, are given by the following
utility functions:
U1(c2, c3) = β [u (c2) + u (c3)] ,
U2 (c2, c3) = u (c2) + βu (c3) ,
where Ut (t = 1, 2) is the assessed utility at time t, u is a continuous and strictly concave
utility function, and β ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter representing the degree of present bias; a
lower β implies that the period-2 agents are biased toward more period-2 consumption.
Agents are assumed to be sophisticated; they are fully aware of their self-control problems.
Agents choose to invest their wealth, k, in liquid or illiquid assets in period 1. It is
assumed that all liquid and illiquid assets have the same exogenous interest rate of zero.
Liquid assets are one-period securities that are sold in period t (t = 1, 2) and redeemed
in period t + 1. Illiquid assets are two-period securities that are sold in period 1 and
redeemed in period 3; they cannot be sold in period 2. Savings in one- and two-period
securities in period 1 are denoted by, s12 and s13, respectively; the subscript ij means the
time of saving, i, and redemption, j. In period 2, agents can save the return from s12 in
one-period securities; this saving is denoted by s23.
Agents displaying present-biased preferences suffer from self-control problems. In par-
ticular, the period-2 selves are tempted to increase consumption in period 2 at the cost
of reduced consumption in period 3. The period-1 selves use illiquid assets to constrain
the consumption plans of their future selves. However, the government, representing the
period-2 selves, is induced to issue public debt in the international market to respond
to the period-2 selves’ desire to undo the commitment made in period 1. This gives
sophisticated agents an incentive to rebalance their portfolios in period 1 to reestablish
their consumption sequence commitment. This, in turn, creates demand for further debt
accumulation. The debt issue, denoted by d, is assumed to be costly and constrained by
the constitutionally imposed borrowing limits denoted by d¯, but debt issue beyond the
limit is available by incurring some additional costs, as specified below.
The budget constraints in periods 1, 2, and 3 are given by
period 1: s12 + s13 ≤ k,
period 2: c2 ≤ s12 + d− s23,
period 3: c3 ≤ s13 + s23 −G(d),
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where G(d) represents the costs of debt repayment, specified as follows:
G(d) =
[
(1 + η)d when d ≤ d¯
(1 + η)d+ γ(d− d¯) when d > d¯,
where η > 0 and γ > 0. Debt is financed by foreign lenders at an interest rate of zero, but
it can be directly distortionary. The term η represents the marginal cost of debt issue,
such as labor supply distortions induced by increased tax burdens for debt repayment
(Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv, 2015). The term γ, introduced in this study, represents the
marginal costs of issuing public debt, conditional on the level of debt being above d¯. Such
costs could be viewed as reputational losses for rule-breaking countries (Eyraud et al.,
2020).
The timing of events and optimization problem at each stage are as follows. In period
1, an agent, who predicts an equilibrium per capita public debt level of d, chooses period
1 savings intended for period 2, s12, and period 3, s13, to maximize the assessed utility
in period 1, U1. Since the debt level is determined by the government, representing the
period-2 selves, each agent takes it as given when making his or her saving decision. The
problem of the agent in period 1 is
max
s12,s13
β [u (s12 + d
e − s23 (s12)) + u (s13 + s23 (s12)−G(d
e))] ,
s.t. s12 + s13 ≤ k,
s12 ≥ 0, s13 ≥ 0,
given de,
where de denotes the expected level of public debt issue in period 2, which is taken as
given. We assume rational expectations of the equilibrium level of debt issue, which will
be defined in the next section. The term s23(s12) implies that agents know that their
choice of s12 (and thus s13) will have an effect on the period-2 saving choice, s23. Private
borrowing is not allowed, following Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015).
In period 2, an agent chooses the savings intended for period 3, s23, to maximize the
assessed utility in period 2, taking the expected level of per capita public debt, de, as
given. The problem of the period-2 agent is
max
s23
u (s12 + d
e − s23) + βu (s13 + s23 −G(d
e)) ,
s.t. s23 ≥ 0
given s12, s13, and d
e.
We assume that period-1 and -2 agents have the same expectations for the debt, de.
The government, representing the period-2 selves, chooses public debt issue, d, to
maximize the utility of the period-2 agents, subject to a non-negativity constraint, d ≥ 0,
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and a constitutionally imposed debt ceiling, d¯, given s12, s13, and s23.
4
max
d
u (s12 + d− s23) + βu (s13 + s23 −G(d)) ,
s.t. d ≥ 0,
given s12, s13, and s23.
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of events.
[Figure 1 here.]
Two remarks are in order. First, in the present framework, the government represents
agents’ preferences perfectly since agents are assumed to be identical. This perfect repre-
sentation makes the difference between agents and the government unclear at first glance.
A key to the difference between them is that agents choose their saving taking future pub-
lic debt issue, d, as given, while the government, as a collective entity, can control public
debt issue. This implies that no one can deviate from the collective decision making on
public debt. Second, related to the first point, d represents public debt, not private debt.
If d is the private debt, then period-1 selves can control the level of d via the choice of
saving in period 1 (Bissin, Lizzeri, and Yariv, 2015). Such a case is not considered in the
present study.
For our analysis, we make the following assumptions. First, the utility function is
specified as
u (c) =
(c)1−σ − 1
1− σ
,
where σ (> 0) is an inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. This assumption
enables us to solve the model analytically, but has no substantial effect on the following
analysis. In particular, the results shown below hold true regardless of whether σ is
greater or less than one. Second, the borrowing must be below the natural debt limit,
k/η, to prevent the government from defaulting. In addition, to define the debt ceiling, it
is assumed that the ceiling is below the natural debt limit, as in the following assumption:
Assumption 1 d¯ < k/η.5
3 Decisions of Agents and Government
As mentioned above, agents are assumed to be sophisticated. Thus, we solve the model
through backward induction; that is, we first solve the government’s problem in period
4Lending in the international market, d < 0, is abstracted away from the analysis since our focus is
on borrowing, d > 0. Allowing for d < 0 does not qualitatively alter the following result.
5This assumption works when we solve the period-1 agents’ optimization problem, as presented in
Appendix A.1.
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2, then the agents’ problem in period 2, and finally the agents’ problem in period 1. Our
result would not change if the timing within period 2 is reversed because the period-2
selves and the government share the same objective.
3.1 Government’s Period-2 Decision
The objective of the government, representing the period-2 selves, is
Vg (s12, s23, d) ≡
(s12 + d− s23)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
+ β ·
(k − s12 + s23 −G(d))
1−σ − 1
1− σ
.
Assuming interior solutions, we can write the first-order conditions with respect to d,
when d ≤ d¯ and d > d¯, as follows:
∂Vg (s12, s23, d)
∂d
∣∣∣∣
d≤d¯
= (s12 + d− s23)
−σ
− β (1 + η) · (k − s12 + s23 − (1 + η)d)
−σ ≤ 0, (1)
∂Vg (s12, s23, d)
∂d
∣∣∣∣
d>d¯
= (s12 + d− s23)
−σ
− β (1 + η + γ) ·
(
k − s12 + s23 − (1 + η + γ)d+ γd¯
)−σ
≤ 0. (2)
Let du and dc denote interior solutions satisfying the first-order conditions in Eqs. (1)
and (2), respectively.6 They are expressed as functions of s12 and s23 as follows:
du (s12, s23) =
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
]
(s12 − s23)
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
, (3)
dc (s12, s23) =
k + γd¯−
[
1 + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
]
(s12 − s23)
(1 + η + γ) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
, (4)
where du (s12, s23) and d
c (s12, s23) satisfy
dc (s12, s23) ⋛ d¯ ⇔ A (s12, s23) ≡
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
]
(s12 − s23)
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
⋛ d¯,
and7
A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) .
6The superscript “u” and “c” mean that the choice of debt is “unconstrained” and “constrained” by
the debt ceiling, respectively. When the choice is constrained, the government can break it by incurring
some additional costs.
7Proof of A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) is as follows. Suppose, to the contrary, that A (s12, s23) >
du (s12, s23), that is, 0 > k/η+s12−s23 holds. The period-2 budget constraint leads to c2 ≤ s12+d−s23 <
s12 + k/η − s23, where the second inequality comes from d ≤ d¯ < k/η. Given c2 > 0, this implies that
0 < s12 + k/η − s23, which is a contradiction.
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The condition of A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) implies that there are four possible cases,
classified according to the relative magnitude among du (s12, s23), A (s12, s23), and d¯, as
illustrated in Figure 2: du (s12, s23) ≤ 0 ≤ d¯ (Panel (a)), 0 < d
u (s12, s23) < d¯ (Panel (b)),
A (s12, s23) ≤ d¯ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) (Panel (c)), and d¯ < A (s12, s23) (Panel (d)). From the
figure, we can find the solution, d, for the government’s optimization problem, denoted
by d∗ (s12, s23), as follows:
d∗ (s12, s23) =


0 when du (s12, s23) ≤ 0,
du (s12, s23) when 0 < d
u (s12, s23) < d¯,
d¯ when A (s12, s23) ≤ d¯ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) ,
dc (s12, s23) when d¯ < A (s12, s23) .
(5)
[Figure 2 here.]
Consider first du (s12, s23), which represents the optimal level of public debt when it
satisfies the debt ceiling. Eq. (3) indicates that du (s12, s23) increases as (s12 − s23) and
β decrease. The term (s12 − s23), representing the period-2 consumption when there is
no debt issue, implies that the marginal utility of the period-2 consumption increases
as (s12 − s23) decreases. The term β, representing the present bias, implies that the
period-2 agents attach a larger weight to the period-2 consumption relative to the period-
3 consumption as β decreases. Thus, the period-2 selves’ preferences for debt financing
increase as (s12 − s23) and β decrease.
More precisely, suppose first that (s12− s23) and β are high, such that d
u (s12, s23) ≤ 0
holds. Then the optimal level of the public debt is below zero. In other words, the gov-
ernment prefers to lend rather than borrow in the international market. However, lending
is not allowed in the present framework. Thus, the government’s choice is constrained by
the non-negativity constraint; the optimal level of public debt becomes d∗ = 0, as illus-
trated in Panel (a) of Figure 2. When (s12− s23) and β are at moderate levels, such that
0 < du (s12, s23) < d¯, the government is not constrained by the non-negativity constraint
or the debt ceiling. Thus, its choice is d∗ = du (s12, s23), as illustrated in Panel (b) of
Figure 1.
Finally, when (s12−s23) and β are low, such that d¯ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) holds, the government
may borrow over the debt ceiling. In particular, its decision depends on the relative
magnitude between A (s12, s23) and d¯. Since A (s12, s23) is decreasing in γ, which represents
the costs of rule breaking, the government finds it is optimal to follow the rule and
issues debt up to the limit, d∗ = d¯, when γ is large, such that A (s12, s23) ≤ d¯, as
illustrated in Panel (c) of Figure 2. However, rule breaking occurs when γ is low, such
that d¯ < A (s12, s23), as illustrated in Panel (d) of Figure 2.
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3.2 Agents’ Period-2 Decision
Next, we consider the period-2 agents’ decision regarding one-period securities, s23. The
objective function of the period-2 agents is:
V2 (s12, s23, d
e) ≡
(s12 + d
e − s23)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
+ β ·
[k − s12 + s23 −G (d
e)]1−σ − 1
1− σ
.
Notice that period-2 agents take de as given when choosing s23 because they are infinites-
imal and thus are unable to control d by choosing s23. The first-order condition with
respect to s23 leads to:
s23 = s
u
23 (s12, d
e) ≡ s12 −
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
de
1 + (β)1/σ
when de ≤ d¯, (6)
s23 = s
c
23 (s12, d
e) ≡ s12 −
k + γd¯−
[
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
]
de
1 + (β)1/σ
when de > d¯. (7)
With the private borrowing constraint, s23 ≥ 0, and the expectation of d = d
e, an
optimal level of s23, denoted by s
∗
23, is given by
s∗23(s12, d
e) =


0 when de ≤ d¯ and s12 ≤ S
u (de) ,
su23 (s12, d
e) when de ≤ d¯ and s12 > S
u (de) ,
0 when de > d¯ and s12 ≤ S
c (de) ,
sc23 (s12, d
e) when de > d¯ and s12 > S
c (de) ,
(8)
where Su (de) and Sc (de) are defined as follows:
Su (de) ≡
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
de
1 + (β)1/σ
, (9)
Sc (de) ≡
k + γd¯−
[
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
]
de
1 + (β)1/σ
. (10)
The period-2 selves attach a larger weight to period-2 consumption than the period-1
selves. This implies that the former selves are induced to increase their period-2 consump-
tion by lowering their saving in s23. In particular, the period-2 selves find it optimal to
save nothing in s23 when the expectation of d
e is low and/or when the saving in one-period
securities, s12, by the period-1 selves is low, such that either s12 ≤ S
u (de) or s12 ≤ S
c (de)
holds. If this were not the case, the period-2 selves could afford to save a portion of the
return from one-period securities, s12, in s23.
3.3 Agents’ Period-1 Decision
Consider the period-1 agents’ objective function, which is given by:
V1 (s12, d
e) ≡
[s12 + d
e − s∗23(s12, d
e)]1−σ − 1
1− σ
+
[k − s12 + s
∗
23(s12, d
e)−G (de)]1−σ − 1
1− σ
.
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Given the expectation of d = de, the period-1 agents choose s12 to maximize their ob-
jective. Let s∗12 denote the solution to the problem. The solution satisfies the following
first-order condition:
∂V1 (s12, d
e)
∂s12
=
[
1−
∂s∗23(s12, d
e)
∂s12
]
· (s12 + d
e − s∗23(s12, d
e))−σ
−
[
1−
∂s∗23(s12, d
e)
∂s12
]
· [k − s12 + s
∗
23(s12, d
e)−G (de)]−σ ≤ 0, (11)
where a strict inequality holds if s12 = 0.
4 Equilibrium
Having described the behavior of agents and the government, we define an equilibrium in
the present framework as follows.
Definition 1: A rational expectations equilibrium is an allocation (s12, s13, s23, c2, c3, d),
such that (i) s12 = s
∗
12(d
e) solves the period-1 agents’ problem given s23 and d = d
e;
(ii) s23 = s
∗
23(s
∗
12(d
e), de) solves the period-2 agents’ problem given s12 and d = d
e;
(iii) rational expectations hold, that is, the solution to the period-2 government’s
problem, d, satisfies d∗
(
s∗12(d
e), s∗23(s
∗
12(d
e), de)
)
= de; and (iv) given s12 = s
∗
12(d
e),
s23 = s
∗
23(s
∗
12(d
e), de), and d = d∗
(
s∗12(d
e), s∗23(s
∗
12(d
e), de)
)
, the allocation (s13, c2, c3)
is determined by the period-1, -2, and -3 budget constraints.
Figure 3 is an illustration of the rational expectations equilibrium.
[Figure 3 here.]
To characterize the equilibrium allocation, we proceed with the analysis in the follow-
ing manner. First, we assume that the period-1 and -2 selves have one of the following
expectations of d: (i) de = 0, (ii) de = du ∈
(
0, d¯
)
, (iii) de = d¯, or (iv) de = dc(> d¯),
where du and dc denote the expectations of agents that the debt issuance is below or
above the ceiling, d¯, respectively. Given the expectation of the debt issuance, we solve for
one-period securities, s12 = s
∗
12(d
e) and s23 = s
∗
23(s
∗
12(d
e), de). Then, we substitute these
into the solution, d = d∗ (s12, s23), for the government problem and identify the condition
in which the expectations are rational.
Let d¯L(β) and d¯H(β)(> d¯L(β)) denote the two threshold values of public debt:
d¯L(β) ≡
k
(1 + η) + {β(1 + η + γ)}
1
σ
, (12)
d¯H(β) ≡
k
(1 + η) + {β(1 + η)}
1
σ
. (13)
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With the use of these two threshold values, we can present the equilibrium level of public
debt in the following proposition. The corresponding allocation of saving and consumption
is presented in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Public Debt)
(i) If 1/(1 + η) < β holds, then the equilibrium debt is below the ceiling, d∗ < d¯.
(ii) If β = 1/(1 + η) holds, then there is a continuum of equilibrium levels of debt, (a)
d∗ ∈
[
0, d¯
]
, if d¯ < k/(2 + η), and (b) d∗ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)], otherwise.
(iii) If 1/ (1 + η + γ) < β < 1/(1 + η) holds, then the equilibrium debt is (a) below the
ceiling, d∗ < d¯, if d¯H(β) < d¯, and (b) up to the ceiling, d
∗ = d¯, otherwise.
(iv) If β = 1/(1 + η + γ) holds, (a) there is a continuum of equilibrium levels of debt,
d∗ ∈
[
d¯, (k + γd¯)/(2 + η + γ))
]
, if d¯ < k/(2 + η); (b) the equilibrium debt is up to
the ceiling, d∗ = d¯, if k/(2 + η) ≤ d¯ ≤ d¯H(1/1(1 + η + γ)); and (c) the equilibrium
debt is below the ceiling, d∗ < d¯, otherwise.
(v) If β < 1/ (1 + η + γ) holds, then the equilibrium debt is (a) below the ceiling, d∗ < d¯,
if d¯H(β) < d¯; (b) up to the ceiling, d
∗ = d¯, if d¯L(β) ≤ d¯ ≤ d¯H(β); and (c) beyond
the ceiling, d∗ > d¯, otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
[Figure 4 here.]
Figure 4 takes β in the horizontal axis and d¯ in the vertical axis, and it illustrates the
classification of equilibrium states according to the level of public debt. Figure 5 illustrates
how the equilibrium levels of public debt, d∗, and the one-period securities from period 1
to period 2, s∗12, change in response to a change in the degree of present bias, represented
by β. As observed from Figure 5, a lower β is associated with a higher level of d∗ and a
lower level of s∗12. A lower β implies that period-2 agents are more present biased relative
period-1 agents. In other words, the period-2 consumption, as planned by the period-2
agents, is excessive from the period-1 agents’ viewpoint. To establish control over period-
2 consumption, period-1 agents reduce the one-period securities, s∗12, that contribute to
period-2 consumption, and instead increase two-period securities, s∗13. Given this behavior
of period-1 agents, period-2 agents, as voters, support more public debt issue to increase
their consumption in period 2.
[Figure 5 here.]
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The result in Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium level of public debt substantially
changes around the two threshold values of β, 1/(1+η) and 1/(1+η+γ). The mechanism
behind these changes is as follows. First, consider the choice of public debt around
β = 1/(1 + η). When β is slightly higher than the threshold, 1/(1 + η), period-2 agents
have little incentive to support public debt issue via voting. Period-1 agents can control
period-2 agents’ decisions through saving decisions in period 1 and attain the first-best
allocation. However, when β is slightly lower than the threshold, 1/(1 + η), period-1
agents are unable to prevent period-2 agents from issuing public debt. This limitation
induces period-1 agents to cut the savings on one-period securities, s∗12, substantially. To
compensate for this loss of savings, period-2 agents choose to increase the public debt
issue considerably. This is the mechanism behind the substantial changes in the amount
of public debt around the threshold β = 1/(1 + η).
Second, consider the choice of public debt around β = 1/(1 + η + γ). When β is
slightly higher than the threshold, 1/(1 + η + γ), period-2 agents support and choose
public debt issue up to the ceiling, d∗ = d¯. This implies that for a β slightly lower than
the threshold, 1/(1 + η + γ), period-2 agents have an incentive to support the public
debt issue beyond the ceiling at the cost of rule breaking. Given this expected behavior
on the part of the period-2 agents, the period-1 agents reduce the one-period securities,
s∗12, to control the excess consumption in period 2. The period-2 agents, in turn, choose
to increase public debt issue to compensate for the loss of the return from one-period
securities. Therefore, there is a substantial change in the amount of public debt around
the threshold of β = 1/(1 + η + γ), as illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 5. However, such
change does not occur in the cases shown in Panel (b) and Panel (c) because the debt
ceiling is high, so the equilibrium level of one-period securities, s∗12, is zero for a β that
is slightly higher than the threshold 1/(1 + η + γ). Thus, period-1 agents are unable to
reduce s∗12 further in response to a decrease in β.
5 Vote on Debt Rule
The analysis, thus far, has assumed that the government takes the fiscal rule, represented
by d¯, as given. This assumption, which follows Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015), is rea-
sonable in the short run, but in the long run there is a tendency toward revising fiscal
rules, as described in the Introduction. This section extends the analysis in the previous
sections by introducing endogenous determination of the debt rule, and it investigates
how the present bias affects, via voting, the design of the debt rules.
For the analysis, we assume that the debt rule is determined before the period-1 selves’
decision on saving, s12 and s13. Thus, the debt rule is set to maximize the period-1 selves’
indirect utility. Within this setting, we consider two cases, β ≥ 1/ (1 + η + γ), which
12
produces no rule breaking, and β < 1/ (1 + η + γ), which involves the possibility of rule
breaking when d¯ is given, and we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 The optimal debt ceiling for the period-1 selves, d¯∗, is
d¯∗


= d¯L(β) if 0 ≤ β <
1
1+η+γ
,
=
{
d¯L(β), 0
}
if β = 1
1+η+γ
,
= 0 if 1
1+η+γ
< β ≤ 1
1+η
,
∈ [0, k/η] if 1
1+η
< β.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Figure 6 illustrates the results in Proposition 2, showing that the optimal debt ceiling
depends on the degree of present bias, β. When the present bias is weak such that
1/(1 + η) < β holds, period-1 agents can curb period-2 agents’ excessive consumption,
and the corresponding debt issues, only through saving decisions on one- and two-period
securities, s12 and s13. In other words, debt ceilings are irrelevant for controlling period-2
agents’ behavior. Thus, period-1 agents can attain the first-best allocation regardless of
the levels of debt ceilings.
[Figure 6 is here.]
When the present bias is strong, such that β ≤ 1/(1 + η) holds, period-1 agents
cannot curb period-2 agents’ behavior only through saving decisions. Debt ceilings are
relevant for controlling period-2 agents’ excessive consumption and public debt issues. In
particular, when β is within the range, (1/(1 + η + γ), 1/(1 + η)], setting the debt ceiling
at d¯∗ = 0 prevents period-2 agents from choosing excess consumption and public debt.
Thus, period-1 agents can attain the first-best allocation by managing savings, s12 and
s13, and debt ceilings, d¯.
However, when β is low, such that β < 1/(1+ η+ γ) holds, setting the debt ceiling at
d¯∗ = 0 induces period-2 agents to break the debt ceiling and thus creates additional costs
for period-1 agents. To avoid such cost increases, period-1 agents need to set the debt
ceiling at a maximum level such that period-2 agents never break it. This implies that
period-2 agents’ incentive for rule breaking determines the standard of the rule chosen by
period-1 agents. Thus, when the degree of present bias is strong, such that β < 1/(1+η+γ)
holds, period-2 agents’ excessive consumption is not fully controlled by period-1 agents’
decisions on saving and debt ceilings; the first-best allocation is not implementable in this
case.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that the implementation of debt
ceilings contributes to managing possible excessive consumption and the associated overis-
sue of public debt by period-2 agents only for the case with moderate values of β ∈
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(1/(1 + η + γ), 1/(1 + η)]. The effectiveness of debt ceilings is limited for the case with
low values of β, such that β < 1/(1 + η + γ) holds. In this case, the possibility of rule
breaking by period-2 agents shapes period-1 agents’ decisions on debt ceilings and thus
induces them to adopt lax, rather than strict, rules. This implies that, for countries with
low values of β, it is inadequate to leave decisions on fiscal rules to each of the countries;
rather, it is necessary to induce them to participate in international cooperation charac-
terized by strict standards such as the Maastricht Criteria and the Stability and Growth
Pact developed by the European Union.
Another implication of the results is that supranational fiscal rules, like those men-
tioned above, produce welfare benefits for countries with low values of β, whereas they
may create welfare losses for countries with moderate values of β. Countries with low
values of β(< 1/(1 + η + γ)) set lax rules when they each set fiscal rules independently.
Lax rules allow the period-2 agents to issue public debt, resulting in a suboptimal allo-
cation. These countries could control overissue of public debt, and thus improve welfare,
by participating in international cooperation that imposes further constraints on debt
issues. However, countries with moderate values of β ∈ (1/(1 + η + γ), 1/(1 + η)] set the
debt ceiling at d¯∗ = 0, and thus attain the first-best allocation, when each sets fiscal
rules independently. Participating in supranational rules that set debt ceilings at positive
levels may induce the period-2 agents in those countries to issue public debt up to the
limits, resulting in a suboptimal allocation. Therefore, the choice of target countries is
important from the viewpoint of optimality.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a theoretical framework to examine the political process of de-
termining public debt policy when voters are endowed with present-biased preferences.
Specifically, we consider a situation in which debt issue is distortionary and constrained
by the debt ceiling, but rule breaking, that is, debt issuance above the ceiling, is available
through the incurrence of additional costs. Within this framework, we established that
violations of fiscal rules, which are often observed in developed countries, occur when the
present bias is strong and the debt ceiling is fairly low. We also studied the endogenous
determination of the debt ceiling through voting and showed the debt rule polarization
across countries: the debt ceiling is set at zero when the bias is weak, whereas it is set at
a positive level when the bias is strong.
The result provides several policy implications for international coordination of fiscal
policies, such as that observed within European Union member states. The first result
implies that states are more likely to deviate from international coordination, such as
the Maastricht criteria, as they become more present biased. The second result implies
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that international agreements on strict debt rules can be formed and followed only by
states endowed with weak present-biased preferences. These implications should be viewed
with caution because they are derived using a simple analytical framework. However,
they could provide one possible explanation for the success and failure of international
agreements on fiscal rules.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and the Equilibrium Allocation
A.1.1 Equilibrium with d > d¯
Suppose that the period-1 and -2 selves expect that de = dc
(
> d¯
)
holds. Eq. (8) leads to
savings by the period-2 selves, when de = dc
(
> d¯
)
as follows:
s∗23(s12, d
c) =
{
0 when s12 ≤ S
c (dc)
sc23 (s12, d
c) when s12 > S
c (dc)
(A.1)
where sc23 (s12, d
c) and Sc (dc) are defined by
sc23 (s12, d
c) ≡ s12 −
k + γd¯−
[
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
]
dc
1 + (β)1/σ
,
Sc (dc) ≡
k + γd¯−
[
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
]
dc
1 + (β)1/σ
.
Figure A.1 illustrates V1 (s12, d
c). When s12 ≤ S
c (dc) holds, the first-order condition,
with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1 (s12, d
c)
∂s12
= (s12 + d
c)−σ −
[
k − s12 − (1 + η + γ) d
c + γd¯
]−σ
≤ 0,
where an interior solution is given by
s12 =
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ) dc
2
.
[Figure A.1 here.]
Alternatively, when s12 > S
c (dc) holds, the first-order condition, with respect to s12
in (11), becomes
∂V1 (s12, d
c)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
c (dc) holds. Notice that
V1 (s12, d
c) is continuous at s12 = S
c (dc), as illustrated in Figure A.1.
The interior solution of s12 and threshold value S
c (dc) are compared as follows:
Sc (dc) ⋛
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ) dc
2
⇔ dc ⋚
k + γd¯
η + γ
.
In addition, the following conditions hold:
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ) dc
2
⋛ 0⇔ dc ⋚
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
,
Sc (dc) ⋛ 0⇔ dc ⋚
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
.
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Furthermore, the three threshold values of dc are ranked as
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
<
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
<
k + γd¯
η + γ
.
The analysis thus far suggests that the allocation of (s12, s23) is given by
s12 > 0, s23 = 0 if d
c < k+γd¯
2+η+γ
< k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
< k+γd¯
η+γ
,
s12 = 0, s23 = 0 if
k+γd¯
2+η+γ
≤ dc < k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
< k+γd¯
η+γ
,
s12 ∈ [0, k] , s23 = s
c
23 (s12, d
c) if k+γd¯
2+η+γ
< k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
≤ dc < k+γd¯
η+γ
,
s12 ∈ [0, k] , s23 = s
c
23 (s12, d
c) if k+γd¯
2+η+γ
< k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
< k+γd¯
η+γ
≤ dc.
Based on this classification, the optimal levels of s12 and s23, when d
e = dc(> d¯), are
given as follows:
(i) s∗12 =
k+γd¯−(2+η+γ)dc
2
, s∗23 = 0 when d
c < k+γd¯
2+η+γ
,
(ii) s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0 when
k+γd¯
2+η+γ
≤ dc < k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
,
(iii) s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s
∗
23 = s12 −
k+γd¯−[(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ]dc
1+(β)1/σ
when k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ
≤ dc.
(A.2)
In what follows, we determine the conditions, such that the expectation of de = dc(> d¯)
is rational, for the three cases in (A.2).
Case of dc <
(
k + γd¯
)
/ (2 + η + γ)
From (4) and (A.2), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following conditions hold:
dc =
k + γd¯−
[
1 + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
]
k+γd¯−(2+η+γ)dc
2
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
and dc <
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
,
or [
1− (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
]
·
[(
k + γd¯
)
− (η + γ) dc
]
= 0 and dc <
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
. (A.3)
The first condition in (A.3) indicates that the rational expectation of public debt is given
by
dc
{
∈
(
d¯, k
η
)
if β = 1
1+η+γ
,
= k+γd¯
η+γ
if β ̸= 1
1+η+γ
.
When β ̸= 1/ (1 + η + γ), dc =
(
k + γd¯
)
/ (η + γ) must satisfy the second condition
in (A.3):
dc =
k + γd¯
η + γ
<
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
,
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but this inequality condition fails to hold. Alternatively, when β = 1/ (1 + η + γ),
dc ∈
(
d¯, k/η
)
with the second condition in (A.3) gives the equilibrium level for ratio-
nal expectation of public debt as
d ∈
(
d¯,
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
)
,
where the set is nonempty if d¯ < k/(2 + η).
Proposition A.1 Suppose that the following conditions hold:
β =
1
1 + η + γ
and d¯ <
k
2 + η
.
There is a rational expectations equilibrium with d ∈
(
d¯,
(
k + γd¯
)
/ (2 + η + γ)
)
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k + γd¯− (η + γ) d
2
,
k + γd¯− (η + γ)d
2
,
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ)d
2
,
k − γd¯+ (2 + η + γ)d
2
, 0
)
.
Case of
(
k + γd¯
)
/ (2 + η + γ) ≤ dc <
(
k + γd¯
)
/
(
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
)
From (4) and (A.2), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following conditions hold:
dc =
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
and
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
≤ dc <
k + γd¯
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
. (A.4)
This level of public debt is above the limit, d¯, if
d¯ <
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
⇔ d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
= d¯L(β).
In addition, dc must satisfy the second condition in (A.4):
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
≤ dc =
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
<
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + (β)1/σ
.
The first inequality holds if and only if β ≤ 1/ (1 + η + γ), and the second inequality
always holds.
Proposition A.2 Suppose that the following conditions hold:
β ≤
1
1 + η + γ
and d¯ < d¯L(β).
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There is a rational expectations equilibrium with
d =
(
k + γd¯
)
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
∈
(
d¯,
k
η
)
,
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
( (
k + γd¯
)
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
,
(β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
(
k + γd¯
)
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
, 0, k, 0
)
.
Case of
(
k + γd¯
)
/
(
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
)
≤ dc
From (4) and (A.2), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following condition holds:
dc =
(
k + γd¯
)
−
[
1 + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
]
k+γd¯−[(1+η+γ)+(β)1/σ]dc
1+(β)1/σ
(1 + η + γ) + (β (1 + η + γ))1/σ
and
(
k + γd¯
)
/
(
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
)
≤ dc, or
k + γd¯
1 + η + γ + (β)1/σ
≤ dc =
k + γd¯
η + γ
.
The associated level of s23 is
s∗23 = s
∗
12 +
k + γd¯
η + γ
,
and the corresponding consumption levels are c2 = c3 = 0, which contradicts the first-
order conditions with respect to c2 and c3. Thus, there is no rational expectations equi-
librium in this case.
■
A.1.2 Equilibrium with d = d¯
Suppose that the period-1 and -2 selves expect that de = d¯ holds. Equation (8) leads to
saving by the period-2 selves when de = d¯ as follows:
s∗23(s12, d¯) =
{
0 when s12 ≤ S
u
(
d¯
)
,
s12 −
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]·d¯
1+(β)1/σ
when s12 > S
u
(
d¯
)
,
where Su
(
d¯
)
is defined as
Su
(
d¯
)
≡
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
· d¯
1 + (β)1/σ
.
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Panel (a) of Figure A.2 illustrates V1
(
s12, d¯
)
. When s12 ≤ S
u
(
d¯
)
holds, the first-order
condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1
(
s12, d¯
)
∂s12
=
(
s12 + d¯
)−σ
−
[
k − s12 − (1 + η)d¯
]−σ
≤ 0,
where an interior solution, given by s12 =
[
k − (2 + η) d¯
]
/2, is feasible because it satisfies
Su
(
d¯
)
>
[
k − (2 + η) d¯
]
/2 ⇔ k/η > d¯. Thus, the optimal level of s12 is given by
s12 =
[
k − (2 + η) d¯
]
/2 when s12 ≤ S
u
(
d¯
)
.
[Figure A.2 here.]
Alternatively, when s12 > S
u
(
d¯
)
holds, the first-order condition, with respect to s12
in (11), becomes
∂V1
(
s12, d¯
)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
u
(
d¯
)
. Notice that V1 is
continuous at s12 = S
u
(
d¯
)
, and that
k − (2 + η) d¯
2
> 0⇔ d¯ <
k
2 + η
,
Su
(
d¯
)
> 0⇔ d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
.
Given these properties, we can conclude that the optimal levels of s12 and s23, when
de = d¯, become:
(i) s∗12 =
k−(2+η)d¯
2
, s∗23 = 0 when d¯ <
k
2+η
,
(ii) s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0 when
k
2+η
≤ d¯ < k
(1+η)+(β)1/σ
,
(iii) s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s
∗
23 = s12 −
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]d¯
1+(β)1/σ
when k
(1+η)+(β)1/σ
≤ d¯.
(A.5)
In what follows, we determine the conditions, such that the expectation of de = d¯ is
rational, for the three cases in (A.5).
Case of d¯ < k/(2 + η)
From (5) and (A.5), the expectation of de = d¯ is rational if the following conditions hold:
A
(
s∗12 =
k − (2 + η) d¯
2
, s∗23 = 0
)
≤ d¯
≤ du
(
s∗12 =
k − (2 + η) d¯
2
, s∗23 = 0
)
and d¯ <
k
2 + η
. (A.6)
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The first condition in (A.6) is reformulated as follows:
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
]
k−(2+η)d¯
2
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
≤ d¯⇔
1
1 + η + γ
≤ β,
and
d¯ ≤
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
]
k−(2+η)d¯
2
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
⇔ β ≤
1
1 + η
.
The equilibrium conditions are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition A.3 Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1
1 + η + γ
≤ β ≤
1
1 + η
and d¯ <
k
2 + η
.
There is a rational expectations equilibrium with d = d¯ and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k − ηd¯
2
,
k − ηd¯
2
,
k − (2 + η)d¯
2
,
k + (2 + η)d¯
2
, 0
)
.
Case of k/(2 + η) ≤ d¯ < k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
From (5) and (A.5), the expectation of de = d¯ is rational if the following condition holds:
A (s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0) ≤ d¯ ≤ d
u (s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0) and
k
2 + η
≤ d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
,
that is, if
d¯L(β) =
k
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η + γ)}1/σ
≤ d¯ ≤
k
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
= d¯H(β) and
k
2 + η
≤ d¯ <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
.
These are summarized as in the following propositions.
Proposition A.4 Suppose that the following condition holds:
max
{
k
2 + η
, d¯L(β)
}
≤ d¯ ≤ d¯H(β).
There is a rational expectations equilibrium with d = d¯ and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
d¯, k − (1 + η) d¯, 0, k, 0
)
.
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Case of k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
≤ d¯
From (5) and (A.5), the expectation of de = d¯ is rational if the following condition holds:
A

s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s∗23 = s∗12 − k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
d¯
1 + (β)1/σ

 ≤ d¯
≤du

s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s∗23 = s∗12 − k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
d¯
1 + (β)1/σ

 and
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
≤ d¯.
The inequality d¯ ≤ du (·, ·) is rewritten as
d¯ ≤
k −
[
1 + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
]
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]d¯
1+(β)1/σ
(1 + η) + {β (1 + η)}1/σ
⇔ η ≤ 0,
which fails to hold for any η > 0. Thus, there is no rational expectations equilibrium with
d = d¯ when k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
≤ d¯.
■
A.1.3 Equilibrium with d ∈
(
0, d¯
)
Suppose that the period-1 and -2 selves expect that de = du ∈
(
0, d¯
)
holds. Eq. (8) leads
to saving by the period-2 selves when de = du ∈
(
0, d¯
)
as follows:
s∗23(s12, d
u) =
{
0 when s12 ≤ S
u(du),
su23 (s12, d
u) when s12 > S
u(du),
(A.7)
where su23 (s12, d
u) and Su(du) are defined as
su23 (s12, d
u) ≡ s12 −
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
du
1 + (β)1/σ
,
Su(du) ≡
k −
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
du
1 + (β)1/σ
.
Panel (b) of Figure A.2 illustrates V1 (s12, d
u). When s12 ≤ S
u(du) holds, the first-order
condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1 (s12, d
u)
∂s12
= (s12 + d
u)−σ − [k − s12 − (1 + η) d
u]−σ ≤ 0,
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where an interior solution, given by s12 = [k − (2 + η) d
u] /2, is feasible if it satisfies the
following:
k − (2 + η) du
2
< Su(du)⇔ du <
k
η
.
This condition is satisfied under Assumption 1, d¯ < k/η, and the definition of du(< d¯).
Alternatively, when s12 > S
u(du) holds, the first-order condition, with respect to s12
in (11), becomes:
∂V1 (s12, d
u)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
u(du) holds. Notice that V1 is
continuous at s12 = S
u(du) and that
k − (2 + η) du
2
> 0⇔ du <
k
2 + η
,
Su(du) > 0⇔ du <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
.
Given these properties, we can conclude that the optimal levels of s12 and s23, when
de = du, become
(i) s∗12 =
k−(2+η)du
2
, s∗23 = 0 when d
u < k
2+η
,
(ii) s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0 when
k
2+η
≤ du < k
(1+η)+(β)1/σ
,
(iii) s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s
∗
23 = s12 −
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]du
1+(β)1/σ
when k
(1+η)+(β)1/σ
≤ du.
(A.8)
In what follows, we determine the conditions such that the expectation of de = du is
rational for the three cases in (A.8).
Case of du < k/(2 + η)
From (3) and (A.8), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following conditions hold:
du =
k −
[
1 + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
· [s∗12(d
u)− s∗23(s
∗
12(d
u), du)]
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
and du <
k
2 + η
,
or [
1− (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
· ηdu =
[
1− (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
· k and du <
k
2 + η
. (A.9)
The first condition in (A.9) implies that the rational expectations level of du is given by
du
{
∈
(
0, d¯
)
when β (1 + η) = 1,
= k/η when β (1 + η) ̸= 1.
When β (1 + η) ̸= 1, the candidate for a solution is du = k/η. This candidate is not
suitable for the solution because a focus on the case of d < d¯ and d¯ < k/η is assumed
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in Assumption 1. When β (1 + η) = 1, any level of du ∈
(
0, d¯
)
with du < k/(2 + η) is
rational. Thus, the equilibrium level of public debt becomes
d ∈
(
0,min
{
k
2 + η
, d¯
})
.
where the set is nonempty if d¯ > 0.
Proposition A.5 Suppose that β (1 + η) = 1 and d¯ > 0 hold. There is a rational expec-
tations equilibrium with d ∈
(
0,min
{
k/ (2 + η) , d¯
})
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k − ηd
2
,
k − ηd
2
,
k − (2 + η)d
2
,
k + (2 + η)d
2
, 0
)
.
Case of k/(2 + η) ≤ du < k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
From (3) and (A.8), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following conditions hold:
du =
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
= d¯H(β) and
k
2 + η
≤ du <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
or
k
2 + η
≤ d¯H(β) <
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
.
The first inequality holds if and only if β (1 + η) < 1; the second inequality always holds.
In addition, du must satisfy du < d¯, that is,
du =
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
= d¯H(β) < d¯.
Proposition A.6 Suppose that the following conditions hold:
β <
1
1 + η
and d¯H(β) < d¯.
There is a rational expectations equilibrium with d = d¯H(β) and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
,
(β (1 + η))1/σ k
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
, 0, k, 0
)
.
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Case of k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
≤ du
From (3) and (A.8), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following conditions hold:
du =
k −
[
1 + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
· [s∗12(d
u)− s∗23(s
∗
12(d
u), du)]
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
and
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
≤ du,
or
du =
k −
[
1 + (β (1 + η))1/σ
]
·
k−[(1+η)+(β)1/σ]·du
1+(β)1/σ
(1 + η) + (β (1 + η))1/σ
and
k
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
≤ du. (A.10)
Solving the first condition in (A.10) for du leads to du = k/η. Following the same reasoning
as the previous case, this candidate is not suitable for the solution. Thus, there is no
rational expectations equilibrium with k/
[
(1 + η) + (β)1/σ
]
≤ d.
■
A.1.4 Equilibrium with d = 0
Suppose that the period-1 and -2 selves expect that de = 0 holds. Eq. (8) leads to saving
by the period-2 selves when de = 0 as follows:
s∗23(s12, 0) =
{
0 when s12 ≤ S
u(0) ≡ k
1+(β)1/σ
,
su23 (s12, 0) ≡ s12 −
k
1+(β)1/σ
when s12 > S
u(0) ≡ k
1+(β)1/σ
.
Panel (c) of Figure A.2 illustrates V1 (s12, 0). When s12 ≤ S
u(0) holds, the first-order
condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1 (s12, 0)
∂s12
= (s12)
−σ − (k − s12)
−σ ≤ 0. (A.11)
An interior solution, given by s12 = k/2, is feasible because it holds that s12 = k/2 <
Su(0) ≡ k/
[
1 + (β)1/σ
]
. Thus, an optimal level of s12 is s12 = k/2 when s12 ≤ S
u(0), as
illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure A.2.
Alternatively, when s12 > S
u(0) holds, the first-order condition, with respect to s12 in
(11), becomes
∂V1 (s12, 0)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
u(0) (see Panel (a) of Figure
A.2). Notice that V1 is continuous at s12 = S
u(0).
Given the expectation of de = 0, the optimal level of s12 becomes
s∗12(0) =
k
2
,
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and the corresponding level of s23 is s
∗
23(k/2, 0) = 0. From (5), the expectation of d
e = 0
is rational if the following condition holds:
du(s∗12, s
∗
23) = d
u
(
k
2
, 0
)
≤ 0⇔ β ≥
1
1 + η
.
Proposition A.7 Suppose that β ≥ 1/ (1 + η) holds. There is a rational expectations
equilibrium with d = 0 and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k
2
,
k
2
,
k
2
,
k
2
, 0
)
.
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Up to now, we have shown seven propositions (Propositions A.1 - A.7). In terms of
the equilibrium public debt, the results in these propositions are classified in the following
way. The equilibrium level of public debt, d∗, satisfies:
(i) d∗ < d¯ if (a) β = 1/(1 + η) (Proposition A.5), (b) β < 1/(1 + η) and d¯H(β) < d¯
(Proposition A.6), or (c) β ≥ 1/(1 + η) (Proposition A.7);
(ii) d∗ = d¯ if (a) 1/(1 + η + γ) ≤ β ≤ 1/(1 + η) and d¯ < k/(2 + η) (Proposition A.3),
or (b) max
{
k/(2 + η), d¯L(β)
}
≤ d¯ ≤ d¯H(β) (Proposition A.4);
(iii) d∗ > d¯ if (a) β = 1/(1 + η + γ) and d¯ < k/(2 + η) (Proposition A.1), or (b)
β ≤ 1/(1 + η + γ) and d¯ < d¯L(β) (Proposition A.2).
We illustrate this classification in Figure 4, taking β in the horizontal axis and d¯ in
the vertical axis. Focusing on β, we can summarize the results as stated in Proposition 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Case of β < 1/(1 + η + γ)
Suppose that β < 1/(1 + η + γ) holds. The equilibrium allocation of consumption for a
given d¯ is shown in Propositions A.2, A.4, and A.6. It is summarized as follows:
(c2, c3) =


(
k+γd¯
(1+η+γ)+{β(1+η+γ)}1/σ
,
{β(1+η+γ)}1/σ(k+γd¯)
(1+η+γ)+{β(1+η+γ)}1/σ
)
when 0 ≤ d¯ < d¯L(β),(
d¯, k − (1 + η)d¯
)
when d¯L(β) ≤ d¯ < d¯H(β),(
k
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
, (β(1+η))
1/σk
(1+η)+(β(1+η))1/σ
)
when d¯H(β) ≤ d¯.
The associated indirect utility function of the period-1 selves, V1(d¯), is:
V1(d¯) =


VA.2(d¯) when 0 ≤ d¯ < d¯L(β),
VA.4(d¯) when d¯L(β) ≤ d¯ < d¯H(β),
VA.6 when d¯L(β) ≤ d¯.
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where VA.2(d¯), VA.4(d¯), and VA.6 are defined as:
VA.2(d¯) ≡
1
1− σ


[
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + {β(1 + η + γ)}1/σ
]1−σ [
1 + {β(1 + η + γ)}(1−σ)/σ
]
− 2

 ,
(A.12)
VA.4(d¯) ≡
1
1− σ
{(
d¯
)1−σ
+
[
k − (1 + η)d¯
]1−σ
− 2
}
, (A.13)
VA.6 ≡


[
k
(1 + η) + {β(1 + η)}1/σ
]1−σ [
1 + {β(1 + η)}(1−σ)/σ
]
− 2

 . (A.14)
The subscript j(= A.2, A.4, A.6) in the expression of Vj in (A.12), (A.13), and (A.14)
implies that the associated allocation of consumption is shown in Proposition j(=A.2,
A.4, and A.6), respectively. This notation rule is also applied in the following.
The function V1(d¯) is continuous for d¯ ∈ (0,∞) because the following properties hold:
lim
d¯→d¯L(β)
VA.2(d¯) = VA.4
(
d¯L(β)
)
and
lim
d¯→d¯H(β)
VA.4(d¯) = VA.6.
In addition, the differentiation of VAi(i = 2, 4, 6) with respect to d¯ leads to
∂VA.2(d¯)
∂d¯
=
[
k + γd¯
(1 + η + γ) + {β(1 + η + γ)}1/σ
]−σ
γ
[
1 + {β(1 + η + γ)}(1−σ)/σ
]
> 0,
(A.15)
∂VA.4(d¯)
∂d¯
=
(
d¯
)−σ
− (1 + η)
[
k − (1 + η)d¯
]−σ
, (A.16)
∂VA.6
∂d¯
= 0, (A.17)
where the following condition holds:
∂VA.4(d¯)
∂d¯
≷ 0⇔ d¯ ≶
k
(1 + η) + (1 + η)1/σ
. (A.18)
Given the assumption of β < 1/(1 + η + γ), we have
k
(1 + η) + (1 + η)1/σ
< d¯L(β),
implying that VA.4 is decreasing in d¯ for the range of
[
d¯L(β), d¯H(β)
)
. Thus, the optimal
d¯ becomes
d¯∗ = d¯L(β),
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and the corresponding allocation of saving, consumption, and public debt is given by
(s12, s13,c2, c3) =
(
0, 0,
k
(1 + η) + {β(1 + η + γ)}1/σ
,
{β(1 + η + γ)}1/σ k
(1 + η) + {β(1 + η + γ)}1/σ
)
and d∗ = d¯∗.
Case of β = 1/(1 + η + γ)
Based on the results in Propositions A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.6, and the corresponding
illustration in Figure 4, we can write the period-1 selves’ indirect utility, V1(d¯), as:
V1(d¯) =


{
VA.1(d¯), VA.2(d¯), VA.3(d¯)
}
when 0 ≤ d¯ < k
2+η
,
VA.4(d¯) when
k
2+η
≤ d¯ ≤ k
(1+η)+( 1+η1+η+γ )
1
σ
,
VA.6 when
k
(1+η)+( 1+η1+η+γ )
1
σ
< d¯,
.
where VA.2(d¯), VA.4(d¯), and VA.6 are expressed in Eqs. (A.12), (A.13), and (A.14), respec-
tively, and VA.1(d¯) and VA.3(d¯) are defined as:
VA.1(d¯) ≡
2
1− σ
[(
k + γd¯− (η + γ)d
2
)1−σ
− 1
]
, d ∈
(
d¯,
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
)
, (A.19)
VA.3(d¯) ≡
2
1− σ
[(
k − ηd¯
2
)1−σ
− 1
]
. (A.20)
Conditions in (A.15), (A.16), and (A.17) indicate that for d¯ ≥ k/(2 + η), VA.4(d¯) is
strictly decreasing in d¯, and VA.6 is independent of d¯. Thus, for d¯ ≥ k/(2 + η), V1(d¯) is
maximized at d¯ = k/(2 + η), and the corresponding value of V1(d¯) is
max V1(d¯)
d¯≥k/(2+η)
= VA,4
(
k
2 + η
)
=
2
1− σ
[(
k
2 + η
)1−σ
− 1
]
.
Next, consider the range of d¯ such that 0 ≤ d¯ < k/(2 + η). For this range, there
are multiple equilibria presented in Propositions A.1, A.2, and A.3, depending on the
expectations of the period-1 selves. In what follows, we specify the maximized value of
V1(d¯) for each expectation.
(i) Case of Proposition A.1
Suppose that for d¯ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)], the period-1 selves expect the allocation presented in
Proposition A.1. There are continuum levels of the equilibrium public debt, d, such that
d¯ < d < (k+ γd¯)/(2 + η + γ). This implies that the indirect utility, VA.1(d¯), is dependent
on the realization of d. In what follows, we show that VA.1(d¯) < VA.4 (k/(2 + η)) holds for
any d ∈
(
d¯, (k + γd¯)/(2 + η + γ)
)
, that is, V1(d¯) is maximized at d¯ = k/(2 + η).
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Assume that the agents in periods 1 and 2 have the same expectation for d and that
their expectation is unaffected by the choice of d¯ in period 1. Under this assumption,
VA.1(d¯) in Eq. (A.19) is strictly increasing in d¯. Then, we have
sup
0≤d¯<k/(2+η)
VA,1(d¯) = lim
d¯→ k
2+η
VA,1(d¯)
=
2
1− σ
·

(k + γk2+η − (η + γ)d
2
)1−σ
− 1

 ,
where the expression in the second line is strictly decreasing in d.
Notice that inf d→ k/(2 + η) when d¯→ k/(2 + η). Given this property, we obtain
sup
0≤d¯<k/(2+η)
VA.1(d¯) <
2
1− σ
·

(k + γk2+η − (η + γ) k2+η
2
)1−σ
− 1


=
2
1− σ
·
[(
k
2 + η
)1−σ
− 1
]
= VA.4
(
k
2 + η
)
.
This indicates that VA.1(d¯) < VA.4 (k/(2 + η)) holds for any d¯ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)]. Therefore,
we conclude that the optimal d¯ is d¯∗ = k/(2 + η) when the period-1 selves expect the
allocation presented in Proposition A.1.
(ii) Case of Proposition A.2
Suppose that for d¯ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)), the period-1 selves expect the allocation presented
in Proposition A.2. The indirect utility function of the period-1 selves is VA.2(d¯) in Eq.
(A.12). Given the assumption of β = 1/(1 + η + γ), the expression in Eq. (A.12) is
reduced to:
VA,2(d¯) =
2
1− σ
·
[(
k + γd¯
2 + η + γ
)1−σ
− 1
]
.
Since VA,2(d¯) is strictly increasing in d¯ , we have
sup
0≤d¯<k/(2+η)
VA,2(d¯) = lim
d¯→ k
2+η
VA,2(d¯)
=
2
1− σ
·
[(
k
2 + η
)1−σ
− 1
]
= VA,4
(
k
2 + η
)
.
This implies that VA,2(d¯) < VA,4 (k/(2 + η)) holds for any d¯ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)). Therefore,
we conclude that the optimal d¯ is d¯∗ = k/(2 + η) when the period-1 selves expect the
allocation presented in Proposition A.2.
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(iii) Case of Proposition A.3
Suppose that for d¯ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)), the period-1 selves expect the allocation presented
in Proposition A.3. The indirect utility function of the period-1 selves is VA.3(d¯) in Eq.
(A.20). The function VA.3(d¯) is strictly decreasing in d¯. For d¯ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)), we have
max
0≤d¯<k/(2+η)
VA,3(d¯) = VA,3(0)
=
2
1− σ
·
[(
k
2
)1−σ
− 1
]
>
2
1− σ
·
[(
k
2 + η
)1−σ
− 1
]
= VA,4
(
k
2 + η
)
.
Therefore, we conclude that the optimal d¯ is d¯∗ = 0 when the period-1 selves expect the
allocation presented in Proposition A.3．
Case of 1/(1 + η + γ) < β ≤ 1/(1 + η)
Suppose that the ceiling is set at d¯ = 0. The corresponding allocation of consumption,
from Proposition A.3, is
(c2, c3) =
(
k
2
,
k
2
)
.
This allocation of consumption is consistent with the solution to the following period-1
selves’ utility maximization problem:
max
(c2)
1−σ
1− σ
+
(c3)
1−σ
1− σ
s.t. c2 + c3 ≤ k.
Thus, the optimal level of d¯ becomes d¯∗ = 0.
Case of β > 1/(1 + η)
When β > 1/(1 + η), the equilibrium allocation of consumption, from Proposition A.7, is
(c2, c3) =
(
k
2
,
k
2
)
∀ d¯ ∈
[
0,
k
η
)
.
Since the allocation is independent from d¯, the optimal level of d¯ becomes d¯∗ ∈ [0, k/η).
■
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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Period-1 agents Period-2 agents Period-2 government
Figure 1: Timing of events.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: Illustration of the period-2 government’s objective function when du(s12, s23) ≤
0 ≤ d¯ (Panel (a)), 0 < du(s12, s23) < d¯ (Panel (b)), A(s12, s23) ≤ d¯ ≤ d
u(s12, s23) (Panel
(c)), and d¯ < A(s12, s23) (Panel (d)).
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Expectation Period-1 agents Period-2 agents Period-2 government
Rational expectation
Figure 3: Rational expectations equilibrium.
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A.2 A.3
A.4
A.6
A.7
A.5, A.6, A.7
A.3, A.5, A.7A.1, A.2, A.3
Figure 4: Classification of the equilibrium states according to the level of public debt.
The horizontal axis takes β; the vertical axis takes d¯. The symbols from A.1 to A.7
correspond to the proposition numbers in the appendix.
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A.2
A.1
A.3 A.5
A.7
A.2
A.6
A.4
A.5
A.7
A.6
A.5
A.7
A.2
A.1
A.3
A.7
A.5
A.2 A.6A.4
A.5
A.7
A.6 A.7
A.5
Figure 5: The figure illustrates how the equilibrium debt (d∗) and the one-period se-
curities from period 1 to period 2 (s∗12) change in response to a change in β. The
parameters β1 and β2 shown in Panel (b) are defined as β1 ≡
1
1+η+γ
(
k−(1+η)d¯
d¯
)σ
and
β2 ≡
1
1+η
(
k−(1+η)d¯
d¯
)σ
.
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Figure 6: The optimal debt ceiling for the period-1 selves according to β.
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(a) (b)
Figure A.1: Illustration of the period-1 selves’ utility, V1 (s12, dc), when[
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ)dc
]
/2 ≤ Sc (dc) (Panel (a)) and
[
k + γd¯− (2 + η + γ)dc
]
/2 >
Sc (dc) (Panel (b)).
38
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure A.2: Illustration of the period-1 selves’utility when de = d¯ (Panel (a)), de = du
(Panel (b)), and de = 0 (Panel (c)).
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